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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2~2(3)(g), (j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issues 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment 
dismissing plaintiff/appellant Millennia Investment Corporation's claim against defen-
dant/appellee Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. (ATGF) for liability under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, which provides that a title insurer is directly liable for its 
title agents' mishandling of escrowed funds in transactions where a title insurance com-
mitment or policy has been ordered. (Plaintiff's Memorandum (1) in Support (Reply) 
of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant Attorneys' Title Guaranty 
Fund, Inc., and (2) in Opposition to Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc.'s Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, R. 680-806 (hereinafter "Opposition Memorandum").) 
This issue involves three sub-issues: 
a. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that section 31A-23-
308, violates article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution (uniform operation of laws). 
(Opposition Memorandum, R. 701-07.) 
b. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that section 31A-23-
308, as written, violates article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution (due process). 
(Opposition Memorandum, R. 698-700.) 
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c. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that because section 
31A-23-308 as written purportedly violates article I, section 7, an exception must be 
read into the statute that a title insurer is not liable unless it directly participates in the 
transaction at issue, where no such exception appears in the language of the statute 
itself. (Opposition Memorandum, R. 695-98.) 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences 
are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Millennia), and no def-
erence is given either to the trial court's factual conclusions or to its legal conclusions. 
Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998); Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co.. 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Const, art. L § 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Utah Const, art. L § 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 31A-23-308 (emphasis added): 
Any title company, represented by one or more title insurance agents, is 
directly and primarily liable to others dealing with the title insurance 
agents for the receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in escrows, 
closings, or settlements with the title insurance agents in all those 
transactions where a commitment or binder for or policy or contract of 
title insurance of that title insurance company has been ordered, or a 
preliminary report of the title insurance company has been issued or 
distributed. This liability does not modify, mitigate, impair, or affect the 
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contractual obligations between the title insurance agents and the title 
insurance company. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Millennia initiated this action against defendant Granite Title and Insurance 
Agency, Inc. (Granite Title) and defendant/appellee ATGF to recover over $400,000 in 
escrowed funds embezzled by Granite Title, an authorized ATGF title insurance agent. 
(See generally Amended Complaint, R. 265-78.) Millennia's predecessor deposited the 
money with Granite Title to fund a loan to be secured by a trust deed on real property 
purportedly owned by the borrowers, and Granite Title agreed to issue an ATGF policy 
insuring first position for the trust deed. Instead, the purported owner turned out to be 
fictitious, and one of Granite Title's owners absconded with the money. Millennia's 
amended complaint states six claims against ATGF, including a claim for liability under 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, which provides that a title insurer is responsible for its 
agents' wrongful disbursement of escrow funds if a title insurance commitment or 
policy has been ordered. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Millennia initiated this action on March 29, 2000. (Complaint, R. 1-13.) ATGF 
answered (R. 22-33), but Granite Title's default was taken on July 14, 2000 (R. 195-
75), and a default judgment was entered against Granite Title on April 24, 2001 (R. 
1056-58). On October 17, 2000, ATGF moved for partial summary judgment, asking 
the trial court to dismiss Millennia's claim under section 31A-23-308. (R. 283-394.) 
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On March 6, 2001, the trial court issued a minute entry granting ATGF's motion. (R. 
971, 974-75.) A written order granting the motion was formally entered on April 16, 
2001. (Order on Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 1025-39, Adden-
dum Exhibit 1 (hereinafter "Order").) On May 7, 2001, Millennia petitioned this Court 
for interlocutory review of the Order; the Court granted the petition on July 12, 2001. 
Millennia had filed its own motion for partial summary judgment in June 2000, 
asking the trial court to rule that ATGF was liable as a matter of law under sec-
tion 31A-23-308. (R. 59-184.) The trial court denied Millennia's motion. (Order f B, 
R. 1026-30, Add. Ex. 1.) Millennia appeals only the granting of ATGF's motion; the 
denial of Millennia's own motion is not at issue. 
Statement of Facts 
On approximately June 6, 1999, Raymond Horsley contacted Millennia, re-
questing that Millennia originate a loan for CMK & Associates and C. Merrill Kent, to 
be secured by real property located in Summit County. (Affidavit of Dan Jones 1 1, R. 
833-34.) Horsley, an employee and owner of Granite Title, was a licensed title insur-
ance and escrow agent, appointed and authorized by ATGF to issue title insurance com-
mitments and policies and to provide escrow, closing, and settlement services. 
(Affidavit of Raymond Horsley 11 1-2, R. 813.) Granite Title issued title policies for 
ATGF exclusively. (Horsley Aff. 1 4, R. 814-15.) 
Millennia worked with White Property No. 2, Ltd. ("White Property), a Texas-
based lender, to arrange the loan. (Jones Aff. 1 4, R. 834.) On several occasions, 
Millennia ordered a title commitment and title insurance policy for White Property. 
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(Horsley Aff. 1 4; R. 814; Jones Aff. 1f 6, R. 834.) Horsley ultimately gave Millennia 
a title commitment bearing the stamped signature of Donald T. Walker, Granite Title's 
chief title officer. (Title Commitment, Ex. D to Horsley Aff., R. 829-32; Horsley Aff. 
11 1, 5, 7; R. 814-15; Jones Aff. 1 3, R. 834; Affidavit of Donald T. Walker 1 2, R. 
365). ATGF authorized Mr. Walker to issue title commitments and policies for ATGF, 
and ATGF knew Horsley used Mr. Walker's signature stamp to issue title insurance 
commitments. (Horsley Aff. 1 1, R. 813-14.) The commitment stated that "the estate 
or the interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment and covered 
herein is fee simple and title thereto is at the effective date hereof vested in: CMK & 
Associates." (Commitment, R. 829.) Based upon this title commitment, Millennia 
agreed to originate the loan and obtain the funds for the loan from White Property. 
(Jones Aff. 1 4, R. 834.)1 
On June 8, 1999, Horsley prepared a settlement statement for the proposed tran-
saction specifying that a title insurance policy from ATGF would be issued to White 
Property in the amount of $445,000. (Settlement Statement, Exhibit B to Horsley Aff., 
R. 818; Horsley Aff. 14, R. 815.) The same day, White Property sent instructions to 
1
 ATGF denies that Horsley was authorized to issue commitments or policies for 
ATGF, that ATGF knew that Horsley was using Walker's signature stamp, and that the 
document actually constituted a valid "commitment." Because Millennia is the non-
moving party, however, its evidence must be taken as true, and the conflict must be 
resolved in its favor. See Wilkinson v. Union Pac. R. Co.. 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 
1998). These factual disputes are not directly material to the appeal, however. The 
only issue on appeal is the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, under 
which a title insurer is liable for its agents' misuse of escrow funds if a commitment is 
"ordered" in connection with a transaction. Accordingly, whether a valid or enforce-
able commitment was actually issued is irrelevant. 
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Granite Title stating that it would wire funds to Granite Title and authorizing Granite 
Title to disburse the funds "as outlined in the settlement statement." (Escrow Instruc-
tions, Exhibit A to Horsley Aff., R. 717; Horsley Aff. 1 4, R. 814; Jones Aff. 11 5-6, 
R. 834.) White Property ordered from Granite Title a title insurance policy insuring 
that White Property was in first position on the property. (Escrow Instructions, R. 
717.) A promissory note for $446,634.12 was executed in the name of CMK & Assoc-
iates and C. Merrill Kent, and a trust deed was executed in CMK's name designating 
White Property as the beneficiary. (Exhibits 3 and 4 to Jones Aff., R. 842-49.) 
While this was taking place, ATGF was aware of questionable dealings by Hors-
ley and Granite Title. As early as April 1999, ATGF was warned by another ATGF 
agent that Granite Title was improperly insuring loans. (April 27 ATGF Fax to Hors-
ley, Exhibit C to Horsley Aff., R. 819-21.) By May 19, 1999, ATGF had been 
contacted about Granite Title by both Washington Mutual Bank and the Utah Insurance 
Department. (See May 19 ATGF Fax to Horsley, Exhibit C to Horsley Aff., R. 822-
23.) Indeed, in May ATGF knew that more than three million dollars had been with-
drawn from Granite Title's account in the last two weeks of April and that Granite Title 
owed significant amounts of money to lenders, contractors, and for property taxes. 
(See id.) Unfortunately, although ATGF described the matter as "very troubling," 
ATGF allowed Granite Title to continue acting on its behalf. (Id.) Approximately 
three weeks later, Horsley wrongfully disbursed the funds White Property had wired 
Granite Title for the CMK loan, contrary to the escrow instructions, and White Prop-
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erty lost all of the money it had wired to Granite Title. (Amended Complaint if 18, R. 
268; ATGF Federal Court Complaint H 39-48, R. 109-110.) 
Millennia and White Property subsequently learned that "CMK & Associates" 
and "C. Merrill Kent" were fictitious. (See ATGF Federal Complaint 1 45, R. 109.) 
In fact, the Summit County property that was purportedly the subject of the trust deed 
was actually owned by Horsley through a limited liability company he controlled. (IcL 
if 46.) One month after the funds were improperly disbursed from Granite Title's trust 
account, ATGF finally terminated Granite Title's authority to act as ATGF's agent. 
(July 9 ATGF Letter to Horsley, Exhibit C to Horsley Aff., R. 825.) 
White Property was only one of several entities whom Horsley had defrauded. 
(See ATGF Federal Complaint, R. 104-22.) In fact, during the same week that Hors-
ley induced White Property to loan money to be secured by the Summit County prop-
erty, Horsley also induced two other lenders to loan money to fictitious entities to be 
secured by the same property. (IcL R. 104-06.) In each instance, Horsley falsely 
represented that fictitious persons or entities owned the property, and in each instance 
the lenders relied upon Horsley's representations and wired Horsley funds to be held in 
escrow, which Horsley instead wrongfully disbursed. (Id.) In fact, when ATGF 
finally bothered to investigate Granite Title, ATGF learned that Granite, through Hors-
ley, had engaged in a number of fraudulent schemes, many involving the same Summit 
County property, dating back to February 1999. (See ATGF Federal Complaint, R. 
104-22.) ATGF also quickly learned that Granite Title had bounced no less than 143 
trust account checks between May 1998 and June 1999. (Granite Title Trust Account 
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Records, Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Brian Coleman, R. 312-58.) Horsley subsequently 
declared bankruptcy.2 (Amended Complaint 1 23, R. 269.) 
White Property assigned its claims against Granite Title and ATGF to Millennia 
in February 2000. (Assignment, Exhibit 6 to Affidavit of Alan Combs, R. 182-84.) 
Subsequently, Millennia initiated this action. (Complaint, R. 1-13.) In June 2000, 
Millennia moved for partial summary judgment on its first cause of action against 
ATGF, for liability under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, which provides that "[a]ny 
title company . . . is directly and primarily liable to others dealing with the title insur-
ance agents for the receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in escrows . . . with the 
title insurance agents in all those transactions where a commitment or binder for or 
policy or contract of title insurance of that title insurance company has been ordered." 
Millennia presented evidence establishing that (1) Granite Title was ATGF's title insur-
ance agent, (2) White Property deposited funds in Granite Title's escrow account, 
(3) White Property ordered a title commitment and an ATGF title insurance policy 
from Granite Title, and (4) the escrowed funds were misappropriated. (Millennia Mo-
tion, R. 67-68.) 
ATGF opposed Millennia's motion and also filed a cross-motion asking the trial 
court to dismiss Millennia's section 31A-23-308 claim or, alternatively, to declare that 
liability under section 31A-23-308 was subject to apportionment under the Comparative 
2
 In October 2001, after the appeal was taken, Horsley was sentenced to 41 
months in jail after pleading guilty to charges of felony wire fraud. Also in October 
2001, Granite Title declared bankruptcy. 
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Fault Act. (ATGF Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 283-87.) While ATGF 
raised numerous factual issues in opposing Millennia's motion, its cross-motion was 
based entirely on three "Material Undisputed Facts": (1) No one informed ATGF about 
the White Property transaction, and ATGF did not know about the transaction; 
(2) ATGF itself was not asked to issue a preliminary report or title insurance policy in 
connection with that transaction; and (3) entities other than title insurance agents handle 
escrow closings of real estate transactions in Utah, including lenders, mortgage 
brokers, real estate brokers, and licensed escrow companies. (Memorandum in Support 
of ATGF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 291-92, Addendum Exhibit 2.) 
Based solely on these three alleged facts, ATGF argued that section 31A-23-308 
violates Utah Constitution article I, section 24, Utah's uniform operation of laws pro-
vision. ATGF also claimed that section 31A-23-308 violates article I, section 7, the 
due process clause. Finally, ATGF argued that because the statute as written pur-
portedly violates due process, the statute must be "construed" to read that an insurer is 
not liable unless the insurer actually knew about a particular transaction before its agent 
stole the escrowed funds. (ATGF Memorandum, R. 289-91.) 
In response, Millennia agreed that the three facts set forth in ATGF's cross-
motion were undisputed, but Millennia contended that the statute is constitutional 
because it was rationally related to a legitimate purpose, i.e., the need to protect the 
public from the harms caused by dishonest title agents like Horsley and Granite Title, 
and because any classifications the statute draws are likewise rational. Millennia fur-
ther explained that ATGF's proposed interpretation of the statute was defeated by the 
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language of the statute itself, and that adding a requirement of actual knowledge by the 
insurer would render the statute ineffective, as a title agent who sets up a phone 
transaction to steal escrow funds is not likely to tell the title insurer about the tran-
saction. (Opposition Memorandum, R. 695-707.) 
On March 6, 2001, the trial court issued a minute entry denying Millennia's mo-
tion and granting ATGF's cross-motion, stating that "Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is denied for the reasons specified in the opposing memoranda" and 
"Defendant ATGF's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted for the 
reasons specified in the supporting memoranda." (Minute Entry Ruling, R. 974-75.) 
ATGF subsequently prepared an order, which the trial court entered on April 16.3 (Or-
der, R. 1025-39, Add. Ex. 1.) The Order holds that section 31A-23-308 violates the 
uniform operation of laws provision because it supposedly "treats title insurers differ-
ently than other similarly situated entities without a reasonable basis." (IcL 1 B(2), R. 
3
 In the portion of the Order denying Millennia's partial summary judgment 
motion, ATGF improperly inserted several "findings" against Millennia, purportedly 
"based upon the undisputed facts." (See Order 11 A(7)-(ll), R. 1027-30, Add. Ex. 1.) 
Any purported findings, however, are wholly improper. This Court has unequivocally 
held that trial courts may not make factual findings in ruling on summary judgment mo-
tions; instead, courts simply determine whether the moving party has established a right 
to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 
P.2d 941, 946 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
Further, the findings are improperly based on disputed evidence. For example, 
the Order finds that Horsley acted as Millennia's agent during the transaction, simply 
because Millennia gave Horsley a $4000 gratuity after the transaction had closed, even 
though Horsley himself testified that there was no such agency relationship. (Compare 
Order 1 A(ll), R. 1029-30, wkh Horsley Aff. 1 3, R. 814.) Because those findings 
were made only in conjunction with the ruling on Millennia's motion, however, and not 
ATGF's motion, those findings have no bearing on this appeal. 
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1030-31.) The Order also concludes that the statute violates the due process clause 
"because the statute imposes liability on someone other than the party at fault (here, the 
title company) which had no knowledge of and could not be expected to have prevented 
the actionable conduct." (IcL 1f B(3), R. 1031.) Finally, the Order holds that to avoid 
the purported due process violation, "the statute must be read to require that the title 
company issue or distribute a commitment, accept an order for title insurance, or other-
wise participate in the transaction before being held liable," and that because ATGF did 
not directly accept an order or issue a commitment or policy, ATGF could not be liable 
under the statute.4 (IdL (emphasis in original).) 
This interlocutory appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in dismissing Millennia's claim against ATGF under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-23-308. First, the trial court erroneously held that section 31A-23-
308 violates article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. A statute is presumed con-
stitutional and will be upheld unless the statute imposes a classification that bears no 
reasonable relationship to the achievement of a legitimate legislative purpose. ATGF 
argued that section 31A-23-308 is unconstitutional because the statute purportedly treats 
title insurers differently from "similarly situated entities" such as "lenders, mortgage 
brokers, real estate brokerages, and licensed escrow companies," which provide escrow 
4
 The trial court further stated that because it was dismissing Millennia's claim 
under section 31A-23-308, the court was not addressing ATGF's argument that such 
liability would have to be apportioned. (Order 1 4, R. 1031.) 
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services. This argument fails, however, because ATGF presented no evidence that 
these escrow providers are similar to title insurers; instead, ATGF's evidence compares 
escrow providers to title agents. Title insurers such as ATGF are not similar to escrow 
providers such as lenders, brokers, etc., as title insurers have a unique role in the real 
estate business and generally work through independent agents, so that the common law 
doctrine of respondeat superior may not be sufficient to protect the public. There is 
also no evidence that escrow providers such as lenders, brokers, etc., pose the same 
risk of defalcation as title agents do. 
In addition to failing to show that other entities are similarly situated to title in-
surers like ATGF, ATGF has failed to show that it is unreasonable to treat these en-
tities differently. Indeed, it has long been established that insurers may be regulated in 
the public interest. Moreover, the legislature could have rationally concluded that there 
was no need to bring escrow providers such as lenders, brokers, etc., within section 
31A-23-308, either because those entities do not pose the same threat of defalcation, or 
because the doctrine of respondeat superior is already sufficient to protect the public 
should such a loss occur, or because title insurers are in a uniquely advantageous pos-
ition to spread the risks of defalcation to the public through premium rates. 
ATGF's argument also fails because a statute is not unconstitutional simply 
because it does not go as far as it could. Cases from Utah and elsewhere recognize that 
remedial legislation may address a problem one step at a time and that a legislature may 
determine that problems posed by one particular field are especially acute and require 
special regulation. This principle defeats ATGF's article I, section 24 argument. 
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The trial court also erred in holding that section 31A-23-308 as written violates 
article I, section 7. To satisfy article I, section 7, a statute need only be rationally 
related to a legitimate objective, and it was perfectly rational for the legislature to pro-
tect the public by holding insurers, who appoint and maintain agents and profit from 
their agents' activities, liable for their agents' misdeeds. ATGF argued that section 
31A-23-308 is unfair because a title insurer supposedly cannot control the acts of its 
agents, but that is absurd: Like every other principal, a title insurer chooses its agents 
and has the right to supervise its agents and insist that they demonstrate financial res-
ponsibility. Indeed, if ATGF had bothered to supervise Granite Title at all, ATGF 
would have seen that Granite Title was misusing its escrow account and could have 
easily prevented the losses that occurred in this case. 
Further, ATGF's argument that it is unconstitutional to impose liability without 
"fault" is meritless, as the law has imposed liability without fault for years. In the stan-
dard respondeat superior situation, a principal is liable for its agent's actions even if the 
principal did not know about them. ATGF has not shown that liability under section 
31A-23-308 is any different. 
Finally, the trial court erred in ruling that because it is unconstitutional to im-
pose liability without fault, an exception must be read into section 31A-23-308 exemp-
ting a title insurer from liability if it did not know about the specific transaction in 
which its agent misused escrowed funds. This reasoning is flawed. As stated in the 
preceding paragraph, imposing liability on a principal for its agents' actions is plainly 
not unconstitutional, even if the principal did not know about those particular actions. 
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Further, the language of the statute does not support ATGF's proposed interpretation, 
and in fact that interpretation would render the statute utterly meaningless. ATGF's 
proposed interpretation is based on an inaccurate and misleading view of the title indus-
try: In the title industry, it is the title agents, and not the insurers, that accept commit-
ment orders and issue title policies. Thus, shielding title insurers from liability where 
they are not directly involved in issuing insurance would mean that the statute would 
rarely apply at all, thus depriving the public of the protections the legislature intended 
to provide by enacting the statute in the first place. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MILLENNIA'S CLAIM 
AGAINST ATGF UNDER SECTION 31A-23-308. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SECTION 31A-
23-308 VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH CON-
STITUTION, AS THE STATUTE DOES NOT ARBITRARILY TREAT 
TITLE INSURERS DIFFERENTLY FROM ANY SIMILARLY SITUATED 
ENTITIES. 
In the Order, the trial court held that section 31A-23-308 violates the Utah Con-
stitution's equal protection provision because the statute "treats title insurers differently 
than other similarly situated entities without a reasonable basis." (Order 1 B(2), R. 
1030-31, Add. Ex. 1.) In particular, the trial court found that the statute treated title 
insurers differently from "escrow companies, lawyers, banks, mortgage brokers, and 
real estate agents," whom the trial court concluded also "handle funds in connection 
with real estate closings and escrows." (Id.) The trial court's reasoning, however, is 
incorrect. 
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A. Section 31A-23-308 is presumed constitutional, and ATGF 
cannot prevail unless it presents evidence establishing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution. 
A statute that does not infringe on a fundamental right or involve a suspect class-
ification will be presumed constitutional and will be upheld against an equal protection 
challenge unless the party challenging the statute establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the classification imposed by the legislation bears no reasonable relationship to the 
achievement of a legitimate legislative purpose. See L.R. & C.R. v. State, 967 P.2d 
951, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988). Under the rational basis test, a statute will be upheld 
unless its classifications are purely arbitrary. See Utah Public Employees' Ass'n v. 
State. 610 P.2d 1272, 1273-74 (Utah 1980); Mountain Fuel Supply. 752 P.2d at 888. 
ATGF thus bears a heavy burden to defeat the presumption that section 31A-23-308 is 
constitutionally valid. 
ATGF's burden is even heavier because ATGF is seeking to sustain a summary 
judgment. As the party seeking summary judgment, ATGF had the "affirmative bur-
den" to present evidence establishing as a matter of law its right to judgment. Lamb v. 
B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1993); see also Wilkinson v. 
Union Pac. R. Co.. 975 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998). Further, in evaluating ATGF's 
evidence, all conflicts and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in Millennia's favor. 
Wilkinson. 975 P.2d at 465. 
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B. ATGF failed to demonstrate that section 31A-23-308 violates 
the uniform operation of laws provision. 
1. Section 31A-23-308 serves a legitimate legislative 
purpose: consumer protection. 
Section 31A-23-308 was originally enacted in 1981, as part of a comprehensive 
amendment of the Title Insurance Act of Utah, former Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-25-1 et 
seq. (repealed and recodified in 1985). Former section 31-25-19 (repealed 1985) auth-
orized title insurers, directly or through agents, to perform acts "incidental to the mak-
ing of any contract or policy of title insurance," including performing escrow, settle-
ment, and closing services. Section 31-25-21 (now § 31A-23-211(3)-(7)) required title 
agents to be licensed to perform escrow functions. Section 31-25-23 (now § 31A-23-
211(l)-(2)) required title agents to obtain fidelity bonds and establish reserve accounts. 
Section 31-25-25 (now codified in part at § 31A-23-313) imposed recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements on title agents. Section 31-25-26 (now § 31A-23-307) set forth 
rules on title agents' handling of escrow funds. Finally, section 31-25-24, now codified 
as section 31A-23-308, made title insurers directly and primarily responsible for their 
agents' misappropriation of escrowed funds. 
Section 31A-23-308 thus plainly serves the legitimate legislative purpose of con-
sumer protection. By making title insurers responsible for the defalcations of their own 
agents, section 31A-23-308 ensures that an individual is not subjected to financial ruin 
by a dishonest title insurance agent. Instead, if a title agent wrongfully disburses funds, 
the lender or purchaser is protected because the insurer must make up any losses. Sec-
tion 31A-23-308 thus supplements the traditional agency principle of respondeat super-
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ior by establishing that when a title agent provides escrow services in connection with a 
real estate transaction, those escrow services are deemed to be within the scope of its 
agency, and as such the insurer is directly liable to the injured party. Cf Garland v. 
Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992) ("a principal is liable for the acts of his 
agent within the scope of the agent's authority").5 
Security of the public when placing funds in escrow is obviously a legitimate 
legislative goal. Further, it cannot be disputed that by holding title insurers liable for 
the defalcations of their agents, section 31A-23-308 does in fact reduce the risk to the 
public caused by dishonest title insurance agents. 
2. ATGF has failed to present evidence establishing that 
escrow companies, attorneys, and others who provide 
escrow services are "similarly situated" as compared 
with title insurers. 
ATGF does not dispute that section 31A-23-308 was intended to serve a legit-
imate purpose, nor does ATGF dispute that section 31A-23-308 furthers that purpose. 
Instead, ATGF claims that the statute violates equal protection because it applies to title 
insurers but not to other types of businesses. 
5
 In other jurisdictions, there is a split of authority as to whether escrow services 
fall within the scope of authority of an agent authorized by a title insurer to issue title 
insurance. Compare Richards v. Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, 866 F.2d 1570, 1574 
(10th Cir. 1989) (ATGF liable for theft of escrow funds by president of title insurance 
agent because escrow was within the scope of agency relationship) with Cameron 
County Savings Ass'n v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co.. 819 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tex. App. 
1991) (insurer not liable because escrow services not within scope of agency). In Utah, 
section 31A-23-308 has rendered the issue moot. Section 31A-23-308 thus recognizes 
that escrow services and title insurance are intertwined in the eyes of the public. 
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To even raise an equal protection argument, however, ATGF must first establish 
that as a title insurer subject to section 31A-23-308, it is "similarly situated" to entities 
that are not subject to the statute. See, e.g.. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State. 779 
P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989) (purpose of article I, section 24 is to prevent classifications 
"in such a manner that those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of a 
law are treated differently by that law"); Mountain Fuel Supply. 752 P.2d at 888 (art-
icle I, section 24 prevents "classifications that result in different treatment being given 
persons who are, in fact, similarly situated")', State Tax Comm'n v. Dep't of Finance. 
576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978) ("the court must determine whether such classific-
ations operate equally on all persons similarly situated"). 
ATGF's evidence is insufficient to show that ATGF is similarly situated to any 
entities that are not covered by section 31A-23-308. The only evidence ATGF cited 
presented to support its uniform operation argument was paragraph 15 of the Affidavit 
of Blake T. Heiner, in which Mr. Heiner testified that entities other than title insurance 
agencies engage in real estate closings: 
Escrow closings of real estate transactions in Utah can be, and are, 
handled by parties other than title insurance agencies including lenders, 
mortgage brokers, real estate brokerages, and licensed escrow companies. 
Each of these parties can receive and disburse funds for parties to a real 
estate transaction, but none of these parties issues title insurance commit-
ments or policies. When these parties handle escrow closings and title 
insurance is desired, the title insurance is secured from a title insurer or 
title insurance agency that does not perform the escrow closing function. 
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(Heiner Aff. K 15, R. 390, Addendum Exhibit 3 (emphasis added).) This evidence is 
insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that section 31A-23-308 violates art-
icle I, section 24. 
a. The Heiner Affidavit provides no evid-
ence of similarities between title insur-
ers and other entities. 
Most importantly, Mr. Heiner's testimony has nothing to do with title insurers! 
Mr. Heiner compares lenders, mortgage brokers, real estate brokers, and escrow com-
panies to title insurance agencies. Section 31A-23-308 imposes liability on title insur-
ers, however, not their agents, and ATGF is an insurer, not an agent. Thus, at best, 
Mr. Heiner's testimony indicates that other entities may provide services similar to 
those provided by title insurance agents, but it does not establish that the services 
provided by the other entities are similar to the services provided by title insurers, or 
that the other entities are similar in any way to title insurers. Without evidence that es-
crow providers are similarly situated to title insurers, ATGF simply cannot demonstrate 
that distinguishing between title insurers and other entities violates equal protection. 
It is axiomatic that title insurers are not similar to other businesses. The most 
important feature of a title insurer is that it provides title insurance, and only title 
insurers provide that service. In other words, title insurers agree to indemnify a lender 
or homeowner for losses caused by defects in a title or encumbrances on a property. 
That service differs vastly from the services provided by lenders, mortgage brokers, 
real estate brokers, or licensed escrow companies; it would be ridiculous to think that a 
lender or homeowner would choose the services of a lender, broker, etc. instead of ob-
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taining title insurance. Importantly, insurers have long been subject to various reg-
ulations and liabilities imposed by legislatures, agencies, and courts, and it is univer-
sally accepted that because of the unique role insurers play in society, this differential 
regulation does not violate equal protection. See, e.g., Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. 
Utah Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751, 757 (Utah 1977) (insurance "is properly 
regarded as an essential service in which the public interest is so involved that it is a 
legitimate subject of regulation in the interest of the general welfare"); State v. Taylor, 
541 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Utah 1975) ("There is nothing unreasonable in the legislative 
determination to designate the insurance business as a distinct class and to create a sep-
arate scheme of taxation therefor."), partially disavowed on other grounds by Consolid-
ation Coal Co. v. Emerv County, 702 P.2d 121, 127 (Utah 1985). 
Indeed, as Mr. Heiner testified, even when someone other than a title agent pro-
vides escrow services for a closing, "title insurance is secured from a title insurer or 
title insurance agency." (Heiner Aff. % 15.) Thus, title insurers are involved in (and 
profit from) real estate transactions even when their agents do not provide escrow ser-
vices. It is therefore reasonable for the legislature to distinguish between title insurers, 
based on their unique role in real estate transactions, and other entities that do not play 
such a role. Significantly, because section 31A-23-308 applies equally to all entities 
that provide title insurance, the statute does not treat similarly situated entities differ-
ently. 
Finally, title insurers are unique in that title insurance is marketed primarily 
through independent agents, who obtain business in part because they provide escrow 
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services. (Notably, chapter 23 of title 31A of the Utah Code is entitled "Insurance 
Marketing.") That is, instead of seeking out a particular title insurer, a customer 
(usually a lender or homeowner) wishing to close a real estate transaction will choose 
someone who can "handle" the entire transaction by preparing closing documents, 
providing escrow services, researching the title, recording the proper documents, and 
arranging for title insurance. The title agent will issue insurance through its principal, 
resulting in income for the insurer. 
The agency relationship between the insurer and agent, however, may be ex-
pressly limited to issuing insurance. See, e.g., Bodell Const. Co. v. Stewart Title 
Guaranty Co., 945 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (agreement expressly excluded 
escrow services from title agency relationship). Thus, even though the insurer profits 
from having an agent that provides escrow and other closing services, the insurer may 
be able to escape common law liability for the agent's defalcations. See idL at 123-24 
(authority to issue title insurance did not imply authority to provide escrow services).6 
By enacting section 31A-23-308, the legislature has guaranteed that an insurer that 
profits from its agents1 escrow services will be responsible for its agents' actions in 
6
 Indeed, ATGF has claimed below that escrow services were outside the scope 
of its agency relationship with Granite Title. This argument fails, however, because 
unlike the agreement in BodelL the Agency Agreement between Granite Title and 
ATGF expressly requires the agent to "conduct[] the closing" to earn its premium, and 
specifically gives ATGF the right to audit and examine Granite Title's escrow accounts. 
(See Agency Agreement W 6, 8(D), R. 87.) 
-21-
providing those services.7 
ATGF' attempt to compare itself to escrow providers such as lenders, mortgage 
brokers, real estate brokers, or independent escrow companies thus makes no sense, as 
there is no evidence to suggest that lenders, mortgage brokers, etc., market their ser-
vices through independent agents under limited agency relationships. Nor has ATGF 
presented evidence that these entities are able to profit from escrow services while 
escaping common law liability for the acts of those providing the services. Indeed, the 
Order's reference to "similarly situated principals" was erroneous, as ATGF presented 
no evidence that such "similarly situated principals" even exist. (Order if B(2), R. 
1030, Add. Ex. 1.) 
The authority upon which ATGF relied below, State Tax Commission v. Depart-
ment of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978), is distinguishable. In State Tax Commis-
sion, the State Insurance Fund, a "private trust fund" providing workers' compensation 
insurance, was treated differently from other private entities providing workers' com-
pensation insurance. IcL at 1298. The Court expressly found that the State Insurance 
Fund had the same risks, the same costs, the same rights, and the same liabilities as the 
7
 Of course, not all title insurers work through independent agents. But if a title 
insurer provides escrow services directly and one of its employees absconds with 
escrowed funds, the insurer will clearly be liable under the common law doctrine of 
respondeat superior, and as such there is no need for liability under section 31A-23-
308. 
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other workers' compensation insurers. IcL at 1298-99. Conversely, ATGF has pre-
sented absolutely no evidence that title insurers share any similarities with lenders, 
mortgage brokers, real estate brokers, or escrow companies. 
b. The Heiner Affidavit does not even est-
ablish that title agents are situated sim-
ilarly to other escrow providers. 
Even if Mr. Heiner's testimony about title agents could somehow be read to 
apply to title insurers, it still would be insufficient to support ATGF's article I, section 
24 claim. There is simply no evidence that the services provided by lenders, brokers, 
etc. are similar to those provided by title insurance agents, or that the other classes of 
escrow providers compete with title insurance agents for business. ATGF has also 
failed to present evidence that the other entities are subject to the same licensing 
requirements as are title agents or insurers, or that the other entities enjoy the same 
limitations on competition that title agents enjoy. 
8
 The Court reasoned as follows: 
Examples of similarities between the Fund and others within its class 
include the following. The assets of the Fund exist only to cover the 
identical obligations covered by private insurers. The Fund has the same 
administrative costs as private insurers: establishment of premium and 
hazard rates, procedures for analyzing claims and making disbursements, 
reinsurance considerations, Fund investment decisions, collection 
procedures, legal fees and policy issuance. . . . The Fund has the same 
rights to sue and be sued and make contracts that a private insurer has. 
The Fund enjoys no immunities not provided to private insurers. The 
only distinguishable feature is that the Fund is administered by a state 
agency, the cost therefor being paid from the premiums. 
State Tax Comm'n. 576 P.2d at 1298-99. 
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Additionally, Mr. Heiner's affidavit fails to establish that the risks of defalcation 
posed by the other types of escrow providers are at all similar to the risks of defalcation 
posed by title insurance agents. (For example, the risks of defalcation by a lender 
providing escrow services in its own transaction are nonexistent, as that would mean 
that the lender is stealing its own escrowed funds.) This flaw is fatal to ATGF's 
uniform operation argument, as the uniform operation analysis does not apply unless 
the groups being compared are "similarly situated with respect to the purpose of a law." 
Blue Cross, 779 P.2d 634 (emphasis added). ATGF acknowledges that the purpose of 
section 31A-23-308 is to protect the public from the risk of a title insurance agent's def-
alcation (ATGF Memorandum, R. 294). Therefore, unless ATGF can establish that the 
other classes of escrow providers are similarly situated as to the risk of defalcation they 
pose, ATGF cannot claim that section 31A-23-308 violates equal protection by applying 
to title insurers but not escrow providers. 
Once again, as the party seeking summary judgment, ATGF was required to pre-
sent evidence establishing as a matter of law that title insurers and other entities are 
similarly situated with respect to the purposes of section 31A-23-308. Yet ATGF has 
established only that entities exist that provide escrow services. This is insufficient to 
satisfy ATGF's burden. 
-24-
3. ATGF has failed to establish that it was unreasonable 
for the legislature to include title insurers within sec-
tion 31A-23-308 while not including entities that pro-
vide escrow services. 
Treating classes of persons or entities differently does not violate article I, sec-
tion 24. Instead, a statute violates article I, section 24 only if the statute draws 
unreasonable distinctions. Further, because a statute is presumed constitutional, the 
challenging party bears the burden of establishing unreasonableness, and in the absence 
of evidence showing that a classification is unreasonable, the statute will be upheld. A 
statute will therefore be upheld if "facts can reasonably be conceived which would just-
ify the distinctions or differences in state policy as between different persons." Baker 
v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 244 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added) (citing Lindslev v. 
National Carbonic Gas Co.. 220 U.S. 61 (1911)). 
Facts can easily be conceived that justify the legislature's decision to include title 
insurers within section 31A-23-308 but not the other entities Mr. Heiner identifies. 
First, the legislature could have rationally concluded that there was no need to bring 
other entities within section 31A-23-308 because those entities simply pose less of a 
threat of defalcation. Or, more importantly, the legislature could have concluded that 
even if a defalcation occurs, respondeat superior liability is sufficient to protect the 
public. As explained in the preceding section, because title insurers work through 
independent agents and can limit the scope of their agency relationships, title insurers 
can benefit from escrow services being provided while avoiding common law liability 
for the actions of those providing the services. Because there is no evidence that other 
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escrow providers work through similarly limited independent agency relationships, the 
legislature may have reasonably determined that respondeat superior principles were 
enough and that there was no need to ensure direct and primary responsibility through a 
statute such as 31A-23-308. 
Similarly, the legislature may have determined that bringing other escrow pro-
viders within section 31A-23-308 was unnecessary because the other escrow providers 
are subject to regulation in other ways, and those regulations are sufficient to prevent 
defalcations or protect the public from harm. For example, persons providing indepen-
dent escrow services in Utah are regulated under Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-22-101 et seq., 
which requires these persons to maintain a minimum net worth, post surety bonds, and 
to allow the Department of Financial Institutions to inspect their books at any time. 
Banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other commercial lenders are 
regulated under various chapters of Title 7 of the Utah Code, as well as by federal law. 
Trust companies are regulated under Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-5-1 et seq. The legislature 
could rationally have determined that these statutes and regulations are adequate to 
protect the public from harm while at the same time minimizing governmental intrusion 
and allowing for optimal levels of competition. 
Section 31A-23-308 is simply part of a broad regulatory scheme that governs all 
escrow providers and their principals in a variety of ways. As the Utah Code itself 
shows, the legislature has determined that the public interest is served by regulating 
certain classes of providers certain ways, and by regulation other providers in other 
ways. For title insurers, the legislature has chosen to encourage self-regulation by 
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making the insurer directly responsible for the actions or omissions of their agents. 
Indeed, the legislature has expressly stated that the purposes of the Insurance Code in-
elude "encouraging] self regulation of the insurance industry" and "encouraging] loss 
prevention as part of the insurance industry." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-101(8), (9). 
ATGF has presented no reason to believe that this legislative decision was improper. 
The legislature may also have rationally decided that it was reasonable to focus 
section 31A-23-308 on title insurers because of their unique and extensive role in the 
real estate business or their status as a participant in a controlled market. A company 
may not write title insurance in Utah unless that company is authorized to do so by the 
Department of Insurance. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-5-212(l)(a) (domestic 
insurer may apply for certificate of authority to engage in insurance business); 31 A-14-
201(l)(a) (foreign insurer may apply for certificate of authority). By licensing a com-
pany to provide those services, then, the state grants a title insurer the right to partic-
ipate in a lucrative market with only limited competition. It would thus be perfectly 
reasonable for the legislature to conclude that as a condition of receiving this privilege, 
a title insurer must be willing to stand behind the agents it holds out to the public. 
Other reasons exist that justify the decision to focus section 31A-23-308 on title 
insurers. For example, the legislature may have determined that title insurers, because 
of the broad scope of their business, are best suited to spread the risks of defalcations to 
the public through increased premium rates or other service charges. Or the legislature 
may simply have determined that the burdens of imposing direct liability on other 
classes of escrow providers outweigh the benefits of such liability. Each of these rea-
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sons is plausible, and each of these reasons justifies the limited focus of section 31A-
23-308. 
In addressing the reasonableness of the statutory classification, it is important to 
note that ATGF has presented no evidence that section 31A-23-308 has interfered with 
its ability to engage in business. "[T]he impact of a measure can be relevant to deter-
mining whether the legislative body has exceeded the bounds of the broad discretion it 
has in fashioning purely economic legislation." Blue Cross. 779 P.2d at 643. See also 
Mountain Fuel Supply. 752 P.2d at 888 (purpose of uniform operation and equal pro-
tection provisions is to prevent classifications that "redound[] to the detriment of some 
of those so classified"). ATGF presented no evidence that in the 20 years since 31A-
23-308's predecessor was enacted, title insurers have lost a single customer as a result 
of the liability the statute imposes. Nor has ATGF presented evidence that title insurers 
are unable to pass the costs section 31A-23-308 imposes onto their customers. Cf. 
Mountain Fuel Supply. 752 P.2d at 891 (challenged tax does not unduly burden Moun-
tain Fuel Supply because "the tax is passed directly through to consumers," because 
Mountain Fuel retained the "overwhelming majority of heating fuel consumers," and 
because Mountain Fuel "encounters relatively little administrative cost in collecting the 
tax"). Indeed, it is doubtful that section 31A-23-308 could affect title insurers' business 
because there is no real substitute for the services title insurers provide (i.e., title 
insurance), and because the liability of section 31A-23-308 applies equally to all who 
provide title insurance in Utah. 
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4. A statute does not violate equal protection or the 
uniform operation of laws provision merely because it 
does not cover all possible evils or because it could 
have gone further. 
Boiled down to its essence, ATGF's complaint is that the legislature violated the 
constitution by protecting the public from dishonest title agents while not protecting the 
same way against dishonest lenders, mortgage brokers, real estate brokers, or licensed 
escrow companies. ATGF thus argued, and the trial court ruled, that if the legislature 
does not protect the public the same way against all potential wrongdoers, then it may 
not protect against any potential wrongdoers. Given that it would be nearly impossible 
to regulate against all possible causes of a problem, or that someone could always claim 
that an unregulated group is similarly situated to a regulated group, the trial court's 
reasoning would prevent the legislature from providing any protection at all. 
Fortunately for the citizens of this state, this Court has expressly rejected the 
trial court's reasoning and has held that "a law is not made unconstitutional simply be-
cause it does not cover all possible evils." Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 
P.2d 816, 821 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). In Greenwood, the Court concluded that 
a municipal ordinance that strictly regulated bull terriers ("pit bulls") did not violate 
equal protection even though the ordinance did not cover certain other potentially dan-
gerous breeds of dogs. The ordinance required special licensing, confinement, and in-
surance requirements for dogs classified as "fierce, dangerous, or vicious," defining pit 
bulls as "vicious animals." The plaintiffs (pit bull owners and a breeders' association) 
challenged the ordinance on several grounds, including article I, section 24, arguing 
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that the ordinance "is underinclusive and therefore violates equal protection because of 
the many breeds which are not included." Id at 821. In upholding the ordinance, the 
Court explained that "a statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might 
have gone farther than it did, [] a legislature need not strike at all evils at the same 
time, and [] reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind." IcL (emphasis added) 
(quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966) (internal citations and 
punctuation omitted)). 
Greenwood defeats ATGF's claim that section 31A-23-308 is unconstitutional 
because it applies to one class of businesses, title insurers, but does not apply to other 
businesses such as lenders or mortgage brokers. As in Greenwood, the legislature has 
determined that one particular class (or "breed") of escrow providers poses a height-
ened risk to the public, and that remedial measures are necessary to protect the public 
from those risks. The legislature has not deemed it necessary, however, to effect those 
remedial measures in connection with other classes of providers, either because the 
other classes do not impose the same risks or because the burdens of imposing the mea-
sures on the other providers would outweigh the benefits of such regulation. In Green-
wood, the court ruled that it was improper to second-guess the legislative determination 
that pit bulls should be subject to strict regulation but not other dogs. It was likewise 
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improper for the trial court in the instant case to second-guess the legislative deter-
mination that section 31A-23-308 should apply only to title insurers.9 
"Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requir-
ing different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one 
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to 
the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a 
remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause 
goes no further than the invidious discrimination." Baker, 607 P.2d at 243-44 (quoting 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (internal citations 
omitted). Section 31A-23-308 plainly does not violate article I, section 24. 
9Courts from other states, applying reasoning similar to Greenwood's, have also 
refused to strike down remedial statutes on the ground that they are allegedly under-
inclusive. For example, the California Supreme Court upheld the State Bar's CLE 
requirements, even though certain groups (such as retired judges and law professors) 
were exempt from those requirements. See Warden v. State Bar of California, 982 
P.2d 154, 164 (Cal. 1999) ("[T]he state . . . properly may limit a regulation to those 
classes of person as to whom the need for regulation is thought to be more crucial or 
imperative."). Similarly, the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld a statute limiting 
commercial operation of "thrill craft" in certain bays while allowing unlimited rec-
reational use. See Kaneohe Bay Cruises v. Hirata, 861 P.2d 1, 8 (Haw. 1993) ("[I]t is 
reasonable that the legislature, in the instant case, could have determined that the most 
prudent and measured response to the problem of water safety and environmental 
preservation in the Bays involved the prohibition of commercial thrill craft operations at 
the present time."). See also Barber v. Anchorage, 776 P.2d 1035, 1039-40 (Alaska 
1989) (upholding ordinance prohibiting portable advertising signs but allowing 
permanent ones); Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P.3d 675, 681-83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) 
(upholding ordinance requiring restaurants to provide non-smoking sections, even 
though ordinance did not apply to similarly situated entities such as bars, bowling 
alleys, or billiard halls); Chicago National League Ball Club v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 
1245, 1249-52 (111. 1985) (upholding noise pollution law prohibiting major league 
baseball team from playing night baseball games in city, even though statute allowed 
city's other major league team to continue playing night games). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SECTION 31A-
23-308 VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 7. 
The trial court concluded that section 31A-23-308 violates the Utah Constit-
ution's due process clause because the statute purportedly "imposes liability on some-
one other than the party at fault (here, the title company) which had no knowledge of 
and could not be expected to have prevented the actionable conduct." (Order 1 B(3), 
R. 1031, Add. Ex. 1.) Once again, the trial court erred, as ATGF failed to establish 
that it is irrational to impose liability on a title insurer for the acts and omissions of its 
agents. Indeed, the trial court's reasoning is flawed because the liability imposed by 
section 31A-23-308 is little different from the vicarious liability the law imposes on 
every principal, which is universally accepted as proper. 
A. There is nothing unreasonable about holding title insurers, who 
hire agents, hold them out to the public, and profit from their 
activities, liable for the conduct of those agents. 
Applying section 31A-23-308 in the instant case, where ATGF denies knowing 
that a title insurance policy was ordered from Granite Title, does not violate Utah's due 
process clause, because imposing strict liability in this instance is neither irrational nor 
fundamentally unfair. Because section 31A-23-308 does not invade fundamental rights, 
it is presumed constitutional and will be overturned only if the statute is not "reasonably 
related to the achievement of any conceivable legislative objective." Division of Con-
sumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil 786 P.2d 1343, 1350 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). 
Rio Vista farther explains that "[i]t is axiomatic that statutes are presumed to be con-
stitutional and that the party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the burden of 
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proving that it is invalid. . . . This burden is especially heavy when attacking an 
economic measure." IcL at 1349-50 (emphasis added). 
Once again, section 31A-23-308 is rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental objective, as the statute protects real estate purchasers and lenders if a title 
insurance agent fails to disburse funds as instructed. Indeed, the trial court did not find 
that the statute failed to achieve a legitimate objective; instead, the trial court concluded 
that the statute was unconstitutional simply because it imposed liability "on someone 
other than the party at fault." (Order \ B(3).) The trial court thus made a policy dec-
ision disguised as a constitutional one. 
Section 31A-23-308 simply reallocates the risks of an agent's malfeasance from 
the innocent person who entrusted funds with a title agent to the insurer whose agent 
lost or stole those funds. It was perfectly rational for the legislature to conclude that as 
between the innocent depositor (who has no control over the escrow agent) and the title 
insurer (who hires the agent, markets its services through the agent, holds the agent out 
to the public as the insurer's representative, has the right to inspect the agent's records 
and terminate the agent, and profits from the agent's activities), fairness requires 
placing the risks of an agent's malfeasance on the insurer. It was also perfectly reason-
able for the legislature to conclude that an insurer is in a better position to handle those 
risks by requiring security from its agents, supervising its agents, and/or spreading the 
risks to the public. 
Indeed, a fundamental premise of the trial court's ruling, that ATGF could not 
have prevented the losses resulting from its agent's defalcation of escrowed funds, is 
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flatly wrong. (See Order if B(3), Add. Ex. 1.) Notably, ATGF submitted no evidence 
that it could not have prevented the losses that resulted from Granite Title's misuse of 
the funds White Property placed in escrow, and without such evidence, ATGF is not 
entitled to summary judgment. Further, the trial court's conclusion is incorrect on its 
face because ATGF easily could have prevented the losses. While ATGF may not have 
been able to totally prevent Granite Title from doing a particular act, ATGF could have 
significantly reduced the likelihood of such an occurrence by investigating Granite Title 
before authorizing it to act as ATGF's agent, investigating Granite Title's employees to 
make sure they could be trusted with handling the public's money, and supervising 
Granite Title to ensure it maintained proper business practices. Indeed, Granite Title 
had been misusing its escrow account for over a year before the White Property tran-
saction took place, and if ATGF had exercised its right to look at Granite Title's bank 
statements (See Agency Agreement 16, R. 87), ATGF could have stopped Granite 
Title's activities before White Property was defrauded. 
Not only could ATGF have acted to reduce the likelihood of misappropriation, 
but ATGF also could have taken basic steps to ensure that such an occurrence did not 
harm the public by requiring Granite Title to post a bond, maintain fidelity insurance, 
and/or demonstrate financial responsibility. Thus, White Property and the other per-
sons Granite Title defrauded would have been protected against the consequences of 
Granite Title's schemes. ATGF always had the right to terminate Granite Title as its 
agent if Granite Title failed to maintain proper financial protections or otherwise acted 
improperly, and ATGF could have protected the public simply by exercising that right. 
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Section 31A-23-308's self-regulation does not impose an extraordinary burden or 
one that title insurance companies do not readily accept in order to market their insur-
ance services. See John C. Murray, Insured Closings: Title Company Agents and 
Approved Attorneys, Practicing Law Institute Handbook Series, PLI Order No. N0-
0050, May 2000 (456 PLI/Real 1161). Section 31A-23-308 is nothing more than stat-
utory codification of the contractual "closing protection letters" many title insurers, in-
cluding ATGF, routinely provide lenders. These closing protection letters are "inten-
ded to indemnify lenders against losses as the result of negligence, dishonesty, fraud, 
bad faith, defalcation by the approved agent or attorney, and failure of the agent or 
attorney to comply with the written closing instructions of the lender, . . . including 
disbursement of funds." IcL at 1164-65. 
B. Imposing strict liability is not unconstitutional, as the law often 
imposes strict liability • 
ATGF's position that it is unconstitutional to impose liability without actual 
knowledge of the actionable conduct simply ignores legal reality. Liability is imposed 
on persons without direct knowledge of actionable conduct all the time. See, e.g., Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-15-1 et seq. (imposing liability on the manufacturer of a defective 
product even if the manufacturer did not know about a defect and could not have pre-
vented it); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519-524A (imposing strict liability on 
those who engage in ultrahazardous activities). Further, an employer is liable for the 
negligent acts of its employees committed within the scope of employment, even if the 
employer did not know of the acts and could not have prevented them. See Restate-
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ment (Second) of Agency § 219. Indeed, it has been universally accepted for decades 
that statutes imposing liability without fault are not unconstitutional: 
[LJiability without fault is not a novelty in the law. The common-law 
liability of the carrier, of the innkeeper, or him who employed fire or 
other dangerous agency or harbored a mischievous animal, was not 
dependent altogether upon questions of fault or negligence. Statutes 
imposing liability without fault have been sustained. 
New York Central R.R. Co. v. White. 243 U.S. 188, 204 (1913) (emphasis added) 
(holding New York's workers' compensation law constitutional). 
The trial court's reasoning also conflicts with the fundamental principle of 
agency law that a principal is liable for the acts of its agent within the scope of the 
agency. E ^ , Garland. 831 P.2d at 110; Phillips v. JCM Dev't Corp.. 666 P.2d 876, 
881 (Utah 1983). Because the principal chooses the agent and holds him or her out to 
the public, justice demands that the principal be responsible for the agent's actions: As 
between the party who hired the agent and an innocent victim, the risks of the agent's 
misdeeds should fall on the party who hired the agent. See, e.g.. Richards v. Attor-
neys' Title Guaranty Fund. 866 F.2d 1570, 1572-73 (10th Cir. 1989) (respondeat sup-
erior liability is based on the principle that "when one of two innocent persons must 
suffer from the acts of the third, he must suffer who put it in the power of the wrong-
doer to inflict the injury."); accord Aiello v. Ed Saxe Real Estate. Inc.. 499 A.2d 282, 
285 (Pa. 1985). No one would seriously contend that imposing liability on a principal 
for an agent's acts violates due process. Yet, the liability imposed by section 31A-23-
308 is no different. 
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Thus, while ATGF complained that section 31A-23-308 imposes liability upon it 
even though ATGF did not know about the particular transaction between Granite Title 
and White Property, ATGF failed to explain how ATGF's position is any different 
from any other principal. In the standard respondeat superior situation, the principal's 
liability does not depend on his or her own fault. E.g., Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line 
Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 356 (1929) ("Few doctrines of the law are more firmly 
established or more in harmony with accepted notions of social policy than that of the 
liability of the principal without fault of his own."). Nor does liability depend on whe-
ther the employer or principal knew about the agent's specific act. E.g., Richards, 866 
F.2d at 1572 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The principal's knowledge of the agent's tort is not a 
necessary element of liability."). Indeed, the principal remains liable "even if he for-
bade the acts or disapproved of them." Aiello, 499 A.2d at 285 (emphasis added). 
Thus, with respect to the principal's knowledge and ability to control, the liability im-
posed by section 31A-23-308 is no different from ordinary respondeat superior liabil-
ity, and it is palpably absurd for ATGF to suggest that applying the statute in this 
instance would violate due process. 
Because liability under section 31A-23-308 is so similar to ordinary respondeat 
superior liability, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Payne is inapposite. 
782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). In Payne, this Court suggested that it might violate due 
process to hold a corporate employee personally liable for signing a subsequently 
dishonored company check if the employee did not know the check was bad. The 
situation in Payne, however, was the reverse of the situation in this case: Payne 
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involved holding the agent liable for the principal's misdeeds, while the instant case 
involves holding a principal liable for its agent's misdeeds. Payne holds that it would 
be arbitrary and unfair to hold an agent liable for his or her principal's actions without 
knowledge, but as established in the preceding section, it is universally accepted that it 
is perfectly appropriate to hold a principal liable for the acts or omissions of his or her 
agent.10 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING SECTION 31A-23-308 
TO REQUIRE THE TITLE INSURER TO PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY IN 
A TRANSACTION BEFORE BEING HELD LIABLE. 
Based entirely on its ruling that section 31A-23-308 violates due process because 
it imposes liability without "fault", the trial court ruled that even though section 31A-
23-308 by its own terms applies in "all" transactions where a commitment or title pol-
icy has been "ordered", an exception must be read into the statute exempting a title 
insurer from liability unless the insurer actually accepts an order, personally issues a 
commitment or policy, or directly participates in the transaction in some other way. 
The trial court's interpretation of section 31A-23-308, however, is patently incorrect. 
10
 ATGF also relied below upon out-of-state parental liability cases to support its 
argument that strict or vicarious liability statutes are unconstitutional, but those cases 
do not help ATGF. First, as an obvious matter, the relationship between ATGF and 
Granite Title is nothing like the relationship between a parent and a child. Unlike a 
parent, ATGF expressly chose Granite Title to act as its agent, ATGF derives a profit 
from Granite Title's activities, and ATGF has the right to terminate its relationship with 
Granite Title if ATGF does not like the way Granite Title was doing business. Second, 
the overwhelming majority of cases hold that parental liability statutes do not violate 
the due process clause. See, e.g.. Board of Ed. of Piscataway Twp. v. Caffiero, 431 
A.2d799(N.J. 1981). 
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First, the statute must be interpreted according to its plain language, which itself 
defeats the trial court's interpretation. The statute, by its own terms, applies whenever 
a title policy has been "ordered". The statute does not require that an order be accep-
ted bv the insurer or a policy actually issued by the insurer. 
Indeed, such an interpretation would make no sense, because title insurers do not 
accept commitment orders or issue policies. Instead, it is the title agents, not the in-
surers, that "accept" policy orders and "issue" title policies. "The pattern of the so-
called national title insurers . . . is to authorize the issuance of policies by local agents. 
. . . [!] Escrow companies are authorized to issue title insurance commitments and 
policies in the name of the insurer." D. Barlow Burke, Jr., Law of Title Insurance 
§ 1.2.3, at 1:28 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis added). The National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners, a national body that drafts model laws covering all aspects of the 
insurance business, even defines a "title insurance agent" as a person who "on behalf of 
the title insurer . . . [determines insurability and issues title insurance reports or pol-
icies, or both, based upon the performance or review of a search, or an abstract of 
title." National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Title Insurance Agent Model 
Act § 2(0)(1) (adopted 1995) (Addendum Exhibit 4). 
ATGF's own practice follows the national model: ATGF's agents, not ATGF, 
issue title commitments and title policies. Indeed, ATGF's Agency Agreement with 
Granite Title states that it is Granite Title's responsibility to conduct title searches, per-
form title examinations, "prepared and is sue [J all title products," and "issuefl a final 
title policy." (Agency Agreement % 8, R. 87, Addendum Exhibit 5 (emphasis added).) 
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Moreover, the Agency Agreement recognizes that ATGF may not even learn that an 
agent has issued a commitment or policy until until as late as 30 days after the closing. 
(See id. 1 8(G).) ATGF's vice president admits that certain individuals at Granite Title 
were "authorized to issue commitments for [and] policies of title insurance on behalf of 
ATGF" (Affidavit of Brian A. Coleman 1 6, R. 307), and ATGF knew Horsley was 
issuing ATGF title commitments using an approved signature stamp of an attorney 
agent of ATGF. (Horsley Aff. 11 1, 2, 4, R. 813-14.) It defies logic to suggest that 
the insurer must itself issue the title commitment or policy for the statute to apply, 
when the title insurance business does not even operate that way.11 
Second, requiring that an insurer directly participate before being held respon-
sible for an agent's defalcation would vitiate the protections of the statute. Section 
31A-23-308 is intended to protect the public from the misdeeds of a dishonest title 
agent. If a title agent is going to embezzle settlement funds, however, it is highly 
doubtful he or she will bother to inform the insurer that title insurance was ordered. 
Thus, requiring that the insurer be expressly notified of a particular order would insu-
late the insurer from liability for the misconduct of an embezzling agent who would not 
want to disclose his or her wrongful conduct. In other words, ATGF's proposed inter-
pretation of section 31A-23-308 would render the statute a nullity in almost every tran-
saction the statute is designed to protect! 
11
 In other words, ATGF has willingly chosen to allow its agents to issue policies 
without ATGF's knowledge. It is therefore disingenuous for ATGF to argue that it 
would violate due process to impose liability on it for the White Property transaction 
merely because ATGF did not know that a policy had been ordered in that transaction. 
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Third, interpreting the statute to require the insurer to receive notice of an order 
would be pointless, because informing the insurer of a particular order would not lead 
to any additional protections for the public. Once again, insurers generally do not learn 
of transactions until after they occur, but even if a title insurer were to learn that 
insurance was requested on a certain property, there is no reason to think the insurer 
would be able to use that knowledge to prevent a loss. For the insurer to prevent the 
loss, the insurer must be able to determine that the title agent intends to embezzle 
escrowed funds, but it is highly doubtful that the insurer could make this determination 
simply by learning that a particular lender wanted to insure a particular property.12 
And because large title insurers such as ATGF undoubtedly issue hundreds or thou-
sands of title policies a year, it is even more far-fetched to think that an insurer would 
notice anything about any one particular transaction. 
Nothing in section 31A-23-308 requires direct participation by an insurer for 
liability to attach, and reading such a requirement into the statute would frustrate the 
very purpose of the statute. Moreover, because placing the responsibility on the in-
surer for its agent's misdeeds does not violate due process, there is no reason to force 
such a tortured and illogical reading into the statute. The statute should thus be inter-
preted as written: The title insurer is liable for its agent's misuse of escrowed funds if 
12
 Instead, the most effective way for an insurer to learn if a title agent poses a 
particular risk of defalcation is for the insurer to audit the records of its agents! As 
pointed out above, Granite Title's trust account had been overdrawn for more than a 
year, as a simple investigation would have shown. Thus, ATGF already had access to 
the information that could have been used to prevent or minimize losses. 
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a title insurance commitment or policy has been "ordered." Because White Property 
ordered a title commitment from Granite Title, ATGF's agent, section 31A-23-308 
makes ATGF liable for Granite Title's misuse of the escrowed funds. Accordingly, 
Millennia has a claim under section 31A-23-308. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Millennia Investment Corporation therefore respectfully requests that 
the Court enter an order reversing the portion of the trial court's Order dismissing Mil-
lennia's claim against ATGF for liability under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308. 
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ATTORNEYS TITLE GUARANTY FUND, 
INC.etal., 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000902574 CN 
Judge: J. Dennis Frederick 
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of plaintiff Millennia Investment Corporation, 
a Utah corporation ("Millennia") dated June 30, 2000 and the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment of Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund ("ATGF") dated October 17, 2000 came on regularly 
for hearing before the Court, the Honorable J Dennis Frederick presiding at 9:00 a.m. on 
February 26, 2001, Millennia appearing through its counsel, Thomas R. Karrenberg, Stephen W. 
Dougherty, and Nathan B. Wilcox, and ATGF appearing through its counsel, Paul C. Drecksel 
and Bruce A. Maak, and the Court having reviewed the file and pleadings and the materials 
submitted by the parties with respect to both Motions, having heard argument of counsel being 
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ruled and ordered as follows: 
A. Millennia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Millennia's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment sought partial summary judgment adjudicating ATGF's liability for 
$433,625.00 in principal and interest thereon based upon Millennia's positions that Millennia was 
the assignee of White Properties ("White"), and White deposited $433,625.00 into an escrow 
account with Granite Title, White allegedly ordered and paid for a title policy from ATGF, and 
Granite Title misappropriated the deposited funds, as a result of which Millennia claims ATGF is 
liable to it under Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308. Millennia submitted the Affidavit of Alan 
Combs dated June 30, 2000 in support of its Motion ("Combs Affidavit"). Thereafter, Millennia 
submitted the Affidavits of Raymond Horsley dated November 8, 2000 ("Horsley Affidavit"), the 
Affidavit of Dan Jones dated November 21, 2000 ("Jones Affidavit"), and the Affidavit of Lewis 
Livingston dated November 10, 2000 ("Livingston Affidavit"). ATGF moved to strike portions 
of the Combs and Livingston Affidavits The Court rules and orders as follows with respect to 
Millennia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and ATGF's Motions to Strike Portions of the 
Combs and Livingston .Affidavits: 
1. ATGFs Motion to Strike Portions of the Combs Affidavit is hereby granted. 
Paragraphs 2 through 9 of the Combs .Affidavit are inadmissible and must be stricken because 
they fail to comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(a), the affiant lacked personal 
knowledge of the matters stated therein, the statements contained therein lack foundation, the 
statements therein mischaracterize the evidence, the statements therein improperly describe the 
contents of documents in violation of the best evidence rule, and the statements therein constitute 
improper legal conclusions. 
2. Paragraphs 2 through 9 of the Combs Affidavit be and the same are hereby 
stricken. 
3. ATGF's Motion to Strike the Livingston Affidavit be and the same is hereby 
granted. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11 of the Livingston Affidavit must be stricken pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(e) and applicable law because they contain 
impermissible representations regarding legislative history, conclusory statements without 
evidentiary foundation, and inadmissible legal opinions. 
4. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11 of the Livingston Affidavit be and the same are 
hereby stncken. 
5 The evidentiary materials submitted by ATGF give rise to multiple genuine issues 
of material fact which preclude the granting of Millennia's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Millennia failed to demonstrate by admissible evidence an entitlement to summary judgment. 
6 As set forth in greater detail below under paragraph B.2 and B.3, Utah Code Ann. 
$3 I V23-308 is unenforceable as a matter of law because it is violative of equal protection and 
due process clauses of the Utah Constitution and/or if constitutionally construed, that statute does 
not apply to the facts presented here. 
7. Attached hereto marked Exhibit 1 is a five page document alleged by Millennia to 
constitute a commitment for title insurance that fulfills the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§3 1A-23-308. Based upon the undisputed facts, Exhibit 1 does not constitute a commitment or 
binder for or policy or contract of title insurance of ATGF or a preliminary report of ATGF 
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within the meaning of Section 31A-23-308 for each of the following independent reasons (i) 
Exhibit 1 does not mention ATGF, Exhibit 1 on its face states that it is enforceable only if a 
cover is attached, and no cover was attached, Exhibit 1 does not contain essential elements 
required to form a commitment to issue title insurance because it contains no commitment or 
agreement to issue a policy, and does not identify a proposed insured; (ii) Exhibit 1 does not 
qualify as a binder or commitment under the governing statutes, which require that a binder or 
commitment contain a description of the subject and amount of insurance; (iii) Exhibit 1 is too 
indefinite to create an enforceable contract because it lacks essential material terms, including the 
amount of insurance to be provided, the amount of the insurance premium, and the name of the 
insured, and (iv) Exhibit 1 was not issued with respect to the transaction in connection with 
which the funds in question were misappropriated 
8. There exist disputed issues of material fact as to whether Millennia/White ever 
orally or by letter requested or ordered a policy of title insurance of ATGF at all. Based upon the 
undisputed facts, however, there was no ordering of a commitment, binder, policy or contract of 
title insurance within the meaning of Utah Code Ann Section 31A-23-308 because no 
enforceable order was received by ATGF To constitute such an enforceable order, the order 
must have been written, contain all essential terms, and be accepted by ATGF, none of which 
occurred here. 
9 Based upon the undisputed facts, Millennia and White looked to Horsley (who 
was an employee of Granite Title), individually to perform for Millennia/White functions relating 
to the origination of the subject loan, to act as a loan broker, to negotiate with the borrower with 
respect to the loan, and to perform due diligence White and Millennia also expected Horsley to 
-4-
handle the closing of the subject loan as a Granite Title employee and in that capacity arrange for 
the issuance of a title insurance policy as the agent of a title insurance company White and 
Millennia's deposit of funds with Horsley, who was performing acts both as an employee of 
Granite Title and separately and individually for Millennia/White, is not a transaction intended to 
be covered by Utah Code Ann §31A-23-308, even assuming it were constitutional 
10 Based upon the undisputed facts, Millennia and White were aware that Horsley 
was individually accepting a substantial payment from them in connection with a transaction in 
which they expected Horsley to act as an employee of Granite Title in handling the closing and 
arranging for the issuance of a title policy Millennia and White's causing or allowing Horsley to 
undertake duties for both Granite Title and separately for them, coupled with ATGFs ignorance 
of those matters, created a conflict of interest and breach of the duties that Horsley owed Granite 
Title and through it to ATGF ATGF is entitled to rescission of any commitment, binder, policy 
or contract of title insurance or preliminary report that was issued, assuming such issuance 
occurred in this case, which did not in fact occur 
11 Based on the undisputed facts, Horsley acted on behalf of White and Millennia m 
originating their loan, performing due diligence on their loan, and handing all contact with the 
prospective borrowers concerning the loan and closing and was individually paid a $4,000 00 fee 
upon closing by Millennia/White Those actions were not within the scope of Horsley's authority 
with Granite Title or Granite Title's authority with ATGF Horsley knew the fraudulent nature of 
the transaction in which he was acting ATGF was ignorant of the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction Because Horsley's knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the transaction was 
integrally related to his duties for White and Millennia, that knowledge is imputed to White and 
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IVIillennia Because Horsley's duties to Granite Title and to Granite Title on behalf of ATGF had 
no connection with the subject matter to which his knowledge related, his knowledge of the 
fraudulent nature of the transaction is not imputed to ATGF 
12 For the foregoing reasons, Millennia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be 
and it is hereby denied 
B. ATGFs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ATGF moved for partial 
summary judgment upon the grounds (i) that Section 31A-23-308 violates constitutional equal 
protection requirements, (ii) that statute violates constitutional due process requirements, and (iii) 
if that statute is enforceable and applies here, then the jury must apportion damages by 
comparing the relative fault of appropriate parties under Utah Code Ann §78-27-38 
1 There exist no genuine issues of material fact bearing upon ATGF's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
2 Utah Code Ann §31A-23-308 violates Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution (which requires that M[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation") 
because it treats title insurers differently than other similarly situated entities without a 
reasonable basis Title insurance agents both handle escrow closings and issue title insurance on 
behalf of title companies (which are the actual insurers) In addition to title insurance agents, 
escrow companies, lawyers, banks, mortgage brokers, and real estate agents handle funds in 
connection with real estate closings and escrows, but only closings handled by title insurance 
agents subject title companies to liability There is no rational basis upon which strict liability 
can be imposed on title companies but not on other similarly situated principals Although 
parties may place funds in escrow with entities other than title insurance agents, the statute 
-6-
singles out title companies as the only entity that may be held strictly liable for the mishandling 
of such funds and only subjects them to liability as to closings handled by title insurance 
companies. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308 violates the due process clause of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 7 because the statute imposes liability on someone other than the 
party at fault (here, the title company) which had no knowledge of and could not be expected to 
have prevented the actionable conduct. To construe §31A-23-308 in a constitutionally 
permissible manner requires that the statute be read to require that the title company have some 
knowledge and/or control over the fraudulent acts of the title insurance agent before liability is 
imposed Thus, the statute must be read to require that the title company issue or distribute a 
commitment, accept an order for title insurance, or otherwise participate in the transaction before 
being held liable. Because the undisputed facts establish that ATGF had no knowledge of the 
transaction and did not issue or distribute a commitment or accept an order for title insurance, the 
statute, construed constitutionally, does not subject ATGF to liability. 
4 Because of the other rulings of the Court, the Court does not address ATGF's 
argument that liability under Section 3 1 A-23-308 must be allocated in accordance with Utah's 
comparative fault statute. 
5 The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of ATGF be and the same is hereby 
granted 
6. The First Cause of Action of the Complaint herein of Millennia be and the same is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits. This Order does not address whether or not 
its various rulings affect the other causes of action contained in the Complaint. 
-7-
c. Miscellaneous. The Coun defers its decision on an award of costs until the Coun 
enters a final Order disposing of all of the claims of all of the panies in this action 
MADE AND ENTERED this 
-8-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served by hand delivering a copy this 6\\ day of 
March, 2001, addressed to: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 




File Number 99-1071A-2493 
1. Effective Date: April 12, 1599 AT 8:00 AM 
2. Policy or policies to be issued: 










Additional Charges (if any) End 
TOTAL $ 
The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this commitment and covered herein 
is fee simple and title thereto is ar the effective date hereof vested in: 
C.M.K. & ASSOCIATES c. /ntt<U\ K^ 
The land referred to in this commitment is locaied in Summit County, State of Utah and is 
described as foDows: 
ALL OF LOT 1. ECKER HILL PLAT "D"SUBDIVISION, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL 
PLAT THEREOF ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER'S 
OFFICE. 
Countersigned at Salt Lake City, Utah 
American Land Title Association Commkmcni-Utah 
Form No. CU-A 
Authorized Officer or Agem 
Member's Number: J071 A 
EXHIBIT " 1 " 
1 
Fiie No. 99-1071A-2493 
SCHEDULE B-Section 1 
Requirements 
l i e following are the requiremenis to be complied with: 
Item (a) Payment to or for the arraum of the grantors or mortgagors of the full consideration for 
the estate or interest to be insured. 
Item (b) Proper instruments) creating the estate or interest to be insured must be executed and 
duly filed for record. 
Item (c) Payment of ail taxes, charges and assessments, levied and **trrerd ag*™^ the subject 
premises which art due and payable. 
Item (d) Pay us the premiums, fees and charges for the policy. In the event, die transaction, for 
which this commitment is furnished, cancels, the minimum cancellation fee will be S200.00. 
Item (e) You must tell us in writing the name of anyone not referred to in this commitment who 
will get an interesi in the land or who will make a loan on the land. We may then mak-p additional 
requirements or exceptions. 
Item (f) If the applicant desires copies of any marten shown as exceptions in Schedule B - Section 
2, the Company will furnish such upon request at no charge or a minimal charge as the case may 
be. 
NOTE: The property address is: 7088 PINECREST DRIVE 
PARK CITY. UTAH 84098 
American Land Title Association Commitment-Utah 
Schedule B-Scciion 1 
Form CU-B 
Vaiid Only if Schedule B and Cover Are Attached. 
2 
File No. 99-1071A-2493 
SCHEDULE B-Secrion 2 
Exceptions 
Tie policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following unless the same arc disposed of 
to the satisfaction of the Company: 
L Rights or Ham* of parties in possession not shown by the public records. 
2. Easements, or claims of easements, not shown by the public records. 
3. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, and any facts- which 
a correct survey and inspection of the premises would disclose and which are not shown by the 
public records. 
4. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material heretofore or hereafter furnished, 
imposed by law and not shown by the public reconis. 
5. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in 
the public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the 
proposed insured acquires for value of record the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered 
by rhis Commitment. 
6. Taxes for the year 1999 are accruing as a lien not yet due and payable. Taxes for the year 1998 
have been paid in the amount of S2,956.68.00. Tax Serial No. EKH-D-1. 
7. Said property is within the boundaries of Park City, and is subject to any charges and assessments 
levied thereunder. No outstanding charges were found. 
8. Master Declaration of Covenanis, Conditions and Restrictions of PineBrook, A Master Planned 
Development, Summit Counry, Utah, dated March 25, 1991 and recorded March 26,1991, as Entry 
No. 338119, in Book 600, ai Page 373-424 records of the Summit County Recorder. 
9. Supplementary Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for ECKER HILL PLATS 
OSiD, Summit Counry, dated April 27, 1995 and recorded April 28, 1995, as Entry No. 00428847, 
in Book 00880, ai Page 00284-00289 records of the Summit County Recorder, 
10. Power and Utility easement(s) for Lot 1 Ecker Hill Plat wD"are/is as follows: 
A Seven (7) foot easement running along the Front Lot Line of subject property 
A Ten (10) foot easement running along Both the Side Lot Lines and the Back Lot Line 
of subject property. 
11. Summit County Ordinance No. 320, an ordinance annexing Ecker Hill Subdivision Plats GfrD into 
Summit County Service area No. 6 and Providing for an effective date upon publication, recorded 
November 04, 1997 as Entry No. 00491600, in Book 01091, at Page 00020-00021 records of the 
Summit County Recorder. 
NOTE: The following names have been checked for judgments: 
C.M.K. SL ASSOCIATES 
3 
No unsaved judgments appear of record in the last eight yean except as shown here*. 
NOTE- UPON COMPLIANCE WITH UNDERWRITING ^ Q ™ * ^ EXCEPTIONS) 1-5 WILL 
BE ^ M T l S FROM THE LOAN POLICY TO BE ISSUED HEREUNDER. 
r . t • ~ r^,rrrminf-d for in this C"T™™mmt- if any, shall contain, in addition 
me Owner's ^ g g F Z s Z Z T * L e f o n ^ g S T ^ c D * ofTrust, if any. reennred 
" T fZ f S l £ t t ^ ft) a ) Unnaiented mining claims, reservations or exceptions in patents 
under Schedule B-Section J ^ ^ j ^ ^ . ^ ^
 o r ntle to water; minerals, oil and gas; (3) 
or in Acts authorizing the issuance tnereoi, w*ia n g ^ . 
Any and aD unpaid taxes, assessments and unredeemed tax sales. 
rnnmprsifmed: 
Authorized Officer or Agent 
Member's Number: 1071A 
American Land Title Association Commitment-Utah 
Schedule B-Secrion 2 
Form No. CU-B 
Please make any inquiries for Title questions to DON WALKER, or for Escrow questions RAYHORSLEY, 
Phone No. 944-1308. 
4 
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u 
N M'30'53" £ • 
B : 34' 
rucxayw 
PUN SPACE W- L-
TOft l 
Tab 2 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (2033) 
Paul C. Drecksel (5946) 
Diana Hagen (8205) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801)532-7750 
Attorneys for Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund 
IN fill IIIIKI.) lUDICIAl DISIRK "I (.'OUkl'Ol' SAL. I l.Alvh COUNT Y 
STATE OF UTAH 
MILLENNIA INVESTMENT ] 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, .; 
v s . • ' ] 
ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTY ] 
FUND, INC., a Colorado corporation, and ] 
GRANITE TITLE AND INSURANCE ] 
AGENCY, INC., a Utah corporation; ; 
Defendants. ) 
> MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
) OF ATGF'S MOTION FOR 
> PARTIAL SUMMARY 
> JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 000902574 
i Ju.jut • >• • • ! .nlerick 
Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. ("ATGF") hereby submits this memorandum in 
support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. This Mcmoi nudum is Mippoited by the 
following deposition testimony and affidavits which are attached: Affidavit of Raymond Horsley 
("Horsley Aff."); Affidavit of Brian Colei nan ("Coleman Aff"), Affidavit of Donald T. Walker 
®n 
insurer knowledge of the subject transaction and some control over the acts of the agent. 
If this Court does not find section 31A-23-308 unconstitutional or inapplicable on the 
bases described above, ATGF is entitled to partial summary judgment in the form of the 
following determination by this Court: if ATGF is held liable under Utah Code Ann. § 
31 A-23-308, the jury must apportion damages by comparing the relative fault of any other 
person or entity at fault for the alleged injury under Utah's Comparative Fault Statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-38. The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that even strict liability is 
subject to comparative fault principles, and it is critical that this Court render such a 
determination now to aid the parties in completing discovery and preparing for the trial of this 
matter. 
MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Neither Mr, Horsley nor anyone else ever had any communication with anyone at 
ATGF about a commitment or binder for or policy or contract of title insurance for Millennia, 
White Property, or anyone else in connection with the Transaction. Nor did Horsley or anyone 
else ever provide any information to anyone at ATGF about Millennia, White Property, CMK or 
the Transaction, and ATGF did not know of Horsley's involvement and dealings with Millennia 
and White Property or about the Transaction. [Horsley Aff. % 7; Coleman Aff. f 9; Walker Aff. 
HI 4-6.] 
2. ATGF never was asked by Horsley or anyone else to issue or distribute a 
iv 
preliminary report of title insurance relating to the Transaction, or to issue a policy of title 
insurant1 runmii' Wind Pnnfteflv T> ;m insttn <1 on sin h a policy. [Coleman All' ]| {K Walker 
Aff. 114-5.] 
3. Escrow closings of real estate transactions in Utah can be, and are, handled by 
parties other than title insurance agencies inch iding lendei s, i nortgage brokers, i eal estate 
brokerages, and licensed escrow companies. Each of these parties can receive and disburse funds 
toi parties to a iv.il estate transaction, but none of these parties issues title insurance 
commitments or policies. When these parties handle escrow closings and tillc insuiaiice is 
desired, the title insurance is secured from a title insurer or title insurance agency that does not 
perform the esnon Hosing furu'u'n ll 'snul ,>t .ill uniMmn"Mi loi the escrow function of 
receiving and disbursing funds to be handled by a company completely separate from the 
compan> issuing title insurance. [Heiner Aff. U 15.] 
v 
Respectfully submitted this « day of October, 2000. 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel 
Paul C. Drecksel 
Diana Hagen 




Bruce A. Maak, Esq. (2033) 
Paul C. Drecksel, Esq. (5946) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801)532-7750 
Attorneys for Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. 
INTTF THIRD l!.i[)|('!M 1)1^ '!«' K""l COIJRI < )f S'M 1 1 Akf t nillMTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MILLENNIA INVESTMENT ] 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ATTORNEYS' TITLE GUARANTY ] 
FUND, INC., a Colorado corporation, and ] 
GRANITE TITLE AND INSURANCE ; 
AGENCY, INC., a Utah corporation; •; 
Defendants. 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) BLAKE T. HEINER 
) Civil No. 000902574 
i Judge J iJemu,-, Irederick 
^1 AIT OF I.H \ri ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
hiakc* i lleiiin berny first dtiiv sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah, of adult age, ai •' ; • • -
all matters stated herein. If called as a witness at trial, I would testify as set forth in this Affidavit. 
This case is the first and only time that I have ever heard of a title insurer, title agency, or an 
employee of either performing such functions on a transaction closed by the same party. 
14. No prudent title insurance underwriter would allow an employee of a title agency to 
receive personal compensation from one party to a closing handled by that agency because, among 
other things, (i) an employee's doing so entails a conflict of interest which is unethical and could 
give rise to claims and suits, and (ii) an employee's doing so could influence the employee to not 
exercise fair, impartial judgment in closing the transaction and determining the form of the title 
insurance commitment or policy. A prudent title insurance underwriter who became aware of a title 
agency' s employee's receipt of such personal compensation would immediately take steps to prevent 
that title agency from issuing the underwriter's policies under such circumstances. 
15. Escrow closings of real estate transactions in Utah can be, and are, handled by parties 
other than title insurance agencies including lenders, mortgage brokers, real estate brokerages, and 
licensed escrow companies. Each of these parties can receive and disburse funds for parties to a real 
estate transaction, but none of these parties issues title insurance commitments or policies. When 
these parties handle escrow closings and title insurance is desired, the title insurance is secured from 
a title insurer or title insurance agency that does not perform the escrow closing function. It is not 
at all uncommon for the escrow function of receiving and disbursing funds to be handled by a 
company completely separate from the company issuing title insurance. 
7 
DATED this \ / g ^ day of October, 2000. 
Blake 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this lb day of October, 2000. 
"" Notary Public" ' ' "I 
TAMI D.AUSTIN 
330 East 400 South 1 
SaK Lake City. Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 1 
April 4,2001 
State of Utah 1 
<1fl£)TARYP 
Residing In 




C i t a t i o n 
IAIC 230-1 
Search Result Rank 2 of 13 Database 
NAIC-MODLRG 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (N.A.I.C.) 
MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 
AGENTS/BROKERS/PROCEDURES 
TITLE INSURANCE AGENT MODEL ACT 
Current through April 2001 
Drafting Note: This model Act should be adopted concurrently with the Title 
.nsurers Model Act because the Acts contain many complementary provisions and 
>oth Acts are required to provide sufficient regulation of title insurance. 
'able of Contents 
. Title and Purpose 
. Definitions 
. Licensing Requirements 
• Examination of Title Insurance Agents 
. Prohibition of Rebate and Fee Splitting 
. Controlled Business Provisions 
. Favored Agent of Title Insurer 
. Required Provisions of Underwriting Contract with Title Insurer 
. Policyholder Treatment 
0. Conditions for Providing Escrow, Closing, or Settlemeiit Services., and 
aintaining Escrow and Security Deposit Accounts 
1. Record Retention Requirements 
2. Application of Other Insurance Code Sections to Title Insurance Agents 
3. Rules and Regulations 
4. Penalties and Liabilities 
5. Violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) 
6. Severability 
7. Effective Date 
. Title and Purpose 
A. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the [insert state] Title 
nsurance Agent Act. 
B. The purpose of this Act is to provide the state of [insert state] with a 
Dmprehensive body of law for the effective regulation and supervision of title 
isurance agents. 
. Definitions 
As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: 
A. "Abstract of title" or "abstract" means a written history, synopsis or 
ammary of the recorded instruments affecting the title to real property. 
B. "Associate" means any: 
(1) Business organized for profit in which a producer of title business is a 
Lrector, officer, partner, employee or an owner of a financial interest; 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
IAIC 230-1 
Page 3 
Laving regulatory authority over banks and trust companies; 
(3) Insured by the appropriate federal entity; and 
(4) Qualified under any additional rules established by the commissioner. 
M. "Referral" means the directing or the exercising of any power or 
.nfluence over the direction of title insurance business, whether or not the 
:onsent or approval of any other person is sought or obtained with respect to 
.fee referral. 
N. "Security" or "security deposit" means funds or other property received 
»y the title insurance agent as collateral to secure an indemnitor's obligation 
.nder an indemnity agreement pursuant to which a title insurer is granted a 
•erfected security interest in the collateral in exchange for agreeing to 
rovide coverage in a title insurance policy for a specific title exception to 
overage. 
0. "Title insurance agent" or "agent" means an authorized person, other than 
bona fide employee of the title insurer who, on behalf of the title insurer, 
erforms the following acts, in conjunction with the issuance of a title 
nsurance report or policy: 
(1) Determines insurability and issues title insurance reports or policies, 
r both, based upon the performance or review of a search, or an abstract of 
itle; and 
(2) Performs one or more of the following functions: 
(a) Collects or disburses premiums, escrow or security deposits or other 
unds; 
(b) Handles escrow, settlements or closings; 
(c) Solicits or negotiates title insurance business; or 
(d) Records closing documents. 
P. "Title insurance business" or "business of title insurance" means: 
(1) Issuing as insurer or offering to issue as insurer a title insurance 
olicy; 
(2) Transacting or proposing to,transact by a title insurance agent any of 
he following activities when conducted or performed in contemplation of or in 
onjunction with the issuance of a title insurance policy: 
(a) Soliciting or negotiating the issuance of a title insurance policy; 
(b) Guaranteeing, warranting or otherwise insuring the correctness of title 
earches for all instruments affecting titles to real property, any interest in 
eal property, cooperative units and proprietary leases and for all liens or 
harges affecting the same; 
(c) Handling of escrow, settlements or closings; 
(d) Executing title insurance policies; 
(e) Effecting contracts of reinsurance; or 
(f) Abstracting, searching or examining titles; 
(3) Guaranteeing, warranting or insuring searches or examinations of title 
o real property or any interest in real property; 
(4) Guaranteeing or warranting the status of title as to ownership of or 
iens on real property and personal property by any person other than the 
>rincipals to the transaction; or 
(5) Doing or proposing to do any business substantially equivalent to any of 
.he activities listed in this subsection in a manner designed to evade the 
>rovisions of this Act. 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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12/31/96 13:29 ft, jRNEYS TITLE B81 944 89S2 NO,861 
AGENCY AGREEMENT 
Please evidence your assent as agent ("Agent") to the terms set forth below by signing and 
returning a copy of this agreement to Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. (" ATGF): 
I ATGF hereby designates and appoints Agent as a member of ATGF for a period of one 
year from the date hereof and thereafter for successive one year periods, until this agreement is 
terminated as hereinafter provided, 
2. In all acts pursuant to this agreement, Agent agrees to be bound by the Articles of 
Incorporation and the By-Laws of ATGF as they may be amended from time to time, and Agent 
agrees to comply with all ruleSj regulations, and instructions of ATGF. 
3 ATGF will supply Agent with all materials necessary for the issuance of title insurance 
products, and Agent will use only those forms that are supplied by ATGF for such purpose. 
4. Agent shall comply with authorizations of law respecting title insurance agents and shall 
not perfonn any acts pursuant to this agreement without a current, valid, title insurance license 
from the Utah State Department of Insurance authorizing Agent to act as an ATGF insurance 
agent. 
5, The premiums collected, fees for title products, and forms are held in trust by the Agent 
for the benefit of ATGF. 
b Agent agrees to permit representatives of ATGF to audit and examine files, policies and 
premium income records (including, but not limited to, escrow and/or trust bank account 
$tatements)of Agent upon the request o$ and reasonable notice by, ATGF, 
7. Agent shall allow ATGF to conduct a credit investigation of Agent at anytime during the 
term of this Agreement. 
8. Agent shall earn 70% of the gross premium and ATGF shall earn 30% if! he gr i vi 
premium when Agent: 
A. Conducts a title search; 
B, Performs an examination; 
C Prepares and issues all title products; 
D Conducts a closing; 
£ Obtains and records documentation necessary to provide marketable title; 
F Issues a final title policy; and 
G Remits to ATGF 30% of the gross premium together with copies of the 
i\sue»' rnmmitments and policies within 30 days of recording, 
7 ' 9 f, 1 
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9. Either of the parties may terminate this Agency Agreement at any time by giving written 
notice to the other. Within five (5) business days from the date of termination of this Agreement 
by Agent or ATGF, Agent shall promptly return to ATGF all supplies, records, forms, and other 
property of any kind belonging to ATGF that are in Agent's possession, and Agent will account 
for and pay ATGF all amounts then owing to ATGF within 10 business days of written notice. 
10. Tf Agent, or his or her firm, is subjea to foreclosure or files for bankruptcy protection, Agent 
agrees that there is an automatic lien in fevor of ATGF placed on premiums and escrow funds. 
11 • The undersigned certifies that everything in his or her ATGF Membership Application is true 
and correct to the best of his or her knowledge. 
12. In any action arising out Of this Agency Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this 2nd day of i*™*ry , 19q7 _ , 




Granite Title Insurance Agency 
Print Name: Harlan Y. Hammond 
7 / 9 6 
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AGENCY AGREEMEPri 
Please evidence your assent as Agent to tip terms set forth below by signing and returning a copy of this agreement to 
Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. (Attorneys1 Tide) 
1. Attomaytf Title hexefcy designates aid ar^irus Agent ft* a m ^ 
from the date hereof and thereafter for two-year periods, until this agreement is terminated as hereinafter provided 
2. In all aces pursuant to this agreement, Agent agrees m be bound by tha Articles of Incorporation and tha bylaws of 
Artornays' Title as they may be amended from time to time, and Agent agrees to comply wim 
and insBucdcns of Attorneys' Title. 
3 . Attorneys' Title will supply Agent with all materials necessary for the issuance of till* insurance products, and 
Agent will u?e only those forms that *x« supplied by Aiicnieys? Title for sueh purpose. 
4. Agent shall comply with authorisations of law regarding title insurance agents and shall not perform any nets 
pursuant to this agreement except while holding a volidUoensetommaPepatoenlcfln^urwiceaftha 
appropriate state andiariang him/her to act as an Attorneys' Title Insurance Agent 
5. All forms, premiums, and fees for title products are held intrust by the Agent for the benefit of Armrneys'Tillc. 
6. Agent agrees to permit representative^) of Attorneys1 Title to audit and examine files, policies and premium 
income records (including, but not limited to, escrow account bank statements) upon die request of Attorneys' 
Title, 
7. Agent shall alio rivesrigatton at any lime durii g the Agenc) relationship 
S, Agent shall earn 60% of the gross premium and Attorneys1 Tixla shall earn 40% of the gross premium when Agent: 
A. Orders a TSR (Title Search Report); 
B. Performs an examination; 
C, Obtains and records documentation necessary to provide marketable tide; 
D, Prepares and issues all title products; 
£ , Conducts or arranges closing; 
F. Issues final title policy; and 
G Remits premium with commitments, policies and endorsements within 30 days of recording. 
9» Upon termination. Agent shall return to Attorneys1 Title all supplies, records, terms, money owed, etc to 
Attorneys' Title within 30 days of written notice, 
10. If the agent, or his/her firm, 'is subject to Foreeii v; i in1 in i1 fl 1 n flank i \ i i mi 11 11 w M 1111 A gi f t % 1I u i 111 c 1i I" i 1111 J u i oiuaii c 
lien placed on premiums and escrow funds. 
T ie undersigned certifies that everything La oris application is correct to the best of his/her knowledge, 
AGENT APPLIi 
PRINTED SIGNATURE ^ 4/95 
^ i ^ J A ^ 3 CtfiQ 
